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aBstract
This paper tracks the recent rise of ideology and evidence discourse as a way of describing good and bad 
Indigenous affairs policy. Expressing dissatisfaction with this discourse, it suggests a slightly more complex 
analytic way of thinking about Indigenous affairs involving three competing principles; equality, choice and 
guardianship. The paper suggests that dominant debates in Indigenous affairs balance these principles and 
move between them over time. Using a fourfold categorisation of ideological tendencies, it also suggests 
that different tendencies of thought about settler society and its relations with Indigenous societies occupy 
different positions in relation to the three competing principles. Finally, using the work of the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response Review Board as an example, the paper examines the role of evidence in 
Indigenous affairs. Evidence, it argues, always needs to be contextualised and is always a part of arguments 
or debates. The role of evidence in Indigenous affairs needs to be understood in relation to the much larger 
issue of balancing competing principles.
Keywords: Australian Indigenous affairs, Principles in Indigenous policy, Northern Territory Emergency 
Response, Ideology in Indigenous affairs.
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IntroductIon
t he terms ‘ideology’ and ‘evidence’ have recently come to the fore in Australian Indigenous affairs. Ideology is generally disparaged as something to be avoided and driven out of policy debates, while 
evidence is generally lauded as the basis of good policy making. This ideology and evidence construction 
of good and bad Indigenous affairs policy began to be prominent during the period from January 2006 to 
November 2007, when Mal Brough was the Howard Coalition Commonwealth government’s fourth Minister 
for Indigenous affairs. The terms were a significant part of the discourse surrounding the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response (NTER) or ‘intervention’, which Brough and Howard initiated in June 2007. They have, 
however, even more strongly taken root on the Labor side of politics, and have been even more prominent 
under the Rudd Commonwealth government elected in November 2007. As the Rudd Labor government has 
reviewed and slightly modified the NTER, and also begun putting its own stamp on Indigenous affairs policy 
more generally, ‘ideology’ and ‘evidence’ have continued to be prominent as major terms of opprobrium and 
praise respectively.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a slightly more complex analytic way of thinking about Indigenous affairs 
which begins with the idea of competing principles and only later raises the ideas of ideology and evidence. The 
paper begins by briefly documenting the recent rise to prominence of the ideology and evidence construction 
of Australian Indigenous affairs, including some contributions—at least in relation to ideology—from the 
prominent Cape York Aboriginal leader Noel Pearson. The paper then takes a step back from these recent 
events and identifies three competing principles which inform Australian Indigenous affairs policy in very 
different ways: equality, choice and guardianship. The third section of the paper suggests that at particular 
times in history the dominant debates in Australian Indigenous affairs have tended to emphasise one or 
two of these principles at the expense of another; but also that the limitations of each principle and the 
persistence of the others lead to an ongoing process of policy debate and readjustment. Reintroducing the 
term ‘ideology’ to the analysis, and developing some of Pearson’s writings, the fourth section of the paper 
argues that there have indeed been swings in Australian Indigenous affairs over the years between Right and 
Left ideological tendencies, as is often claimed in the ideology and evidence construction. However, using a 
fourfold rather than a twofold categorisation of ideological tendencies, the paper suggests that each of the 
ideological tendencies sits closest to a particular principle and that Indigenous affairs always involves some 
genuinely difficult balancing of all three competing principles. 
The fifth section of the paper turns to the role of evidence. By examining the work of the NTER Review 
Board, this section suggests how evidence in policy processes is always embedded in contexts and debates, 
which inevitably leads us back, in Indigenous affairs, to the three competing principles. The concluding 
remarks of the paper return to the writings of Noel Pearson and note that in his search for a radical centre 
in Australian Indigenous affairs, Pearson does not focus on evidence, but rather looks to dialectical tension 
between and synthesis of pairs of opposing principles. Although this is a somewhat different analytic schema 
2 sanders
centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research
to my own, Pearson and I seem to be agreeing that competing or opposing principles are at the heart of 
Indigenous affairs and that balancing or synthesising them requires conceptual argument and debate as 
much as evidence.
Ideology and evIdence dIscourse sInce 2006
Although Minister Brough was a willing user of the growing ideology and evidence discourse in Indigenous 
affairs during his twenty months as the head of the Commonwealth’s Families, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs portfolio, it was in fact his Labor Opposition shadow ministerial counterpart, Senator Chris 
Evans, who seemed to contribute more directly to establishing the prominence of these terms. On 10 March 
2006, Evans delivered a speech entitled ‘The End of Ideology in Australian Indigenous Affairs’. The shadow 
minister argued that in the past ‘both major political parties’ had ‘pursued their ideological convictions in 
Indigenous policy to the detriment of Indigenous Australians’. The ‘clash of political ideologies’, he argued, 
had distracted ‘focus from our respective policy failings’ and ‘ideologically driven policy’ would ‘continue 
to fail Indigenous Australians in the future’ (Evans 2006: 1–2). Predictably, Evans condemned the Howard 
Government’s administrative re-arrangement of Indigenous affairs in 2005 as ‘just the latest ideological 
experiment’ which was also ‘doomed to fail’. But perhaps more surprisingly, Evans also condemned his own 
party when he argued that:
Labor’s ideological commitment to the rights agenda, self-determination and reconciliation was 
not matched by a successful attack on the fundamental causes of Indigenous disadvantage. We 
put too much faith in the capacity of the rights agenda to contribute to overcoming Indigenous 
disadvantage (Evans 2006: 3). 
In the future, Evans argued, Labor would ‘look beyond our ideology and look to the evidence’. The ‘guiding 
principle’ would be ‘the evidence of what works and what does not…. what is successful in overcoming 
Indigenous disadvantage’ (Evans 2006: 7–8). More specifically Evans argued that Labor ‘must engage more 
and adopt a less ideological stance in the welfare debate’. He pointed to Noel Pearson’s ‘contributions on 
economic development, welfare dependency and individual responsibility’ as having ‘fundamentally shifted 
the Indigenous debate’ and as confronting ‘real and raw issues that challenge us all’ (Evans 2006: 8). As 
opposition spokesperson Evans said he would be ‘joining the debate about the effects of welfare, violence 
and grog on Indigenous communities’ as these are ‘real problems that ruin Indigenous lives and must be 
confronted’ (Evans 2006: 8).
A month and half later on 29 April 2006, Mal Brough, in his first major ministerial speech, joined this 
debate about the effects of welfare income on Aboriginal families, citing his own ‘experience’ in recently 
‘visiting Aboriginal communities’, as well as that of Pearson and the Chair of the National Indigenous 
Council, Sue Gordon (Brough 2006: 2). Brough argued not only that the ‘misuse of this discretionary income’ 
was ‘destroying families’ in Aboriginal communities, but also that voluntary Family Income Management 
initiatives, supported by his department, were showing the way forward:
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we have the evidence that proves that reducing discretionary income and ensuring payments are 
directed to their intended purpose makes a real and positive impact on those we are seeking to 
assist. The question, therefore, is how do we achieve this more widely (Brough 2006: 2-3).
While Brough indicated that he, personally, was ready to ‘take the tough decisions and move to a system 
that requires certain welfare recipients to have part of their payments directed specifically to the benefit of 
their children’, he also noted that his ‘thoughts’ that day were his ‘own’ and ‘not Government policy’ (Brough 
2006: 3). He would, however, be having ‘discussions’ with his ‘colleagues’ to ensure that ‘welfare works for 
and not against, the most vulnerable’ (Brough 2006: 3).
Two and half weeks later on 15 May 2006, Indigenous affairs erupted into national attention. Nannette 
Rogers, a central Australian crown prosecutor, gave details on the ABC’s Lateline program of some horrific 
Aboriginal child sexual abuse cases in which she had been professionally involved. In the debates which 
followed, the word ‘ideology’ was again to the fore as a term of opprobrium, though sometimes paired with 
some words other than ‘evidence’ as its laudatory opposite. For example in a matter of public importance 
debate in the House of Representatives on 30 May 2006, the Labor Member for the Northern Territory seat 
of Lingiari, Warren Snowdon, accused the Howard government of having ‘pursued its agenda to reshape 
the Indigenous affairs policy landscape in its own image, with a single-minded ideological commitment’ 
(Australia, House of Representatives (HR) 2006: 29). In reply, Minister Brough accused the Member for 
Lingiari of ‘revisiting an ideological approach that has failed’ (Australia, HR 2006: 32). Brough expressed his 
willingness to ‘put the ideologies behind us’ on the understanding that ‘the two fundamentals’ which needed 
to be dealt with were ‘law and order and faith in our criminal justice system’ (Australia, HR 2006: 36). In 
further reply, Labor Member for Kingsford Smith in New South Wales, Peter Garrett, argued that:
Some of the differences that we have about ideology and approach should not blind us to the 
needs that Indigenous people have (Australia, HR 2006: 36).
While Garrett agreed that ‘law and order’ needed to be addressed, he also urged attention to other ‘underlying 
issues’ as well, such as ‘generations of governments’ mistreatment and neglect’ and looking at ‘ways in which 
Indigenous people can meaningfully engage’ with governments (Australia, HR 2006: 36).
As it turned out, these were just the opening exchanges in a war of words in Australian Indigenous affairs 
which would continue for the next two years and beyond. Further allegations of child abuse were aired 
on Lateline in June 2006, relating to the Aboriginal community of Mutitjulu adjacent to Uluru. This led 
to the Northern Territory Government establishing a Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal 
Children from Sexual Abuse in all communities across the Northern Territory. When the report of that Board 
of Inquiry was published almost a year later, it became the basis on which the Howard Commonwealth 
government launched its ‘national emergency’ intervention in the Northern Territory from late June 2007 
(Brough 2007).1
One of the other prominent contributors in this war of words in Indigenous affairs has been Noel Pearson. 
In December 2006, in an article in The Australian newspaper, Pearson complimented Evans for ‘rethinking 
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the fundamental principles and the philosophy’ of Labor’s Indigenous affairs policies. However, he also asked 
why, despite ‘goodwill across the political spectrum’ and ‘across the community, from the cities and the 
regions’, this had ‘not translated into reform’ (Pearson 2006)? In April 2007, in the lead up to the fortieth 
anniversary of the famous Aborigines constitutional alteration referendum, Pearson seemed to answer his 
own question in another article in The Weekend Australian by arguing that in Indigenous affairs ‘Australia 
is still divided into two ideological tribes’. As he put it:
One tribe comprising most indigenous leaders and possibly most indigenous people (but by 
no means an overwhelming majority) and their progressive supporters holds the view that 
the absence or insufficient realization of rights is the core of the indigenous predicament in 
our country.
The other tribe comprises most non-progressive, non-indigenous Australians and their 
conservative political leaders (including substantial numbers in the Labor Party) who hold 
the view that it is the absence of responsibilities that lies at the core of our people’s malaise 
(Pearson 2007a).
Pearson saw these two ideological tribes as ‘insistent and deafly opposed camps’, which helped explain why 
‘Indigenous policy is still at such a juvenile stage’ in Australia (Pearson 2007a). He saw the rights-oriented 
progressives, or Left, as having generally dominated debate in Australian Indigenous affairs since the 1967 
referendum and the more responsibility-oriented Right as having risen to prominence in more recent times 
(see also Pearson 2007b). Pearson described his own position as an attempt to enunciate a more sophisticated 
‘radical centre’ in Australian Indigenous affairs which advocates ‘a synthesis of the rights and responsibilities 
paradigms’ (Pearson 2007a).
I will return to Pearson’s ideas later, not just in his newspaper articles but also as enunciated in a longer 
article published in the Griffith Review in mid 2007 (Pearson 2007c). Now, however, I want to turn to a few 
more examples of the way in which politicians and others have not only disparaged ideology, but have also 
lauded evidence in recent Australian Indigenous affairs debates.
The first is Brough on the occasion of losing his House of Representatives seat of Longman at the November 
2007 Commonwealth election. In conceding defeat, not only in his seat, but also to the Rudd Labor 
government as a whole, Brough said:
The work we have commenced in the Northern Territory – I just hope and pray it continues.
I took the chance during this campaign to go back to places like Hermannsburg and Mutitjulu, 
and I saw in the eyes of the women out there their desperate need for this to continue.
So I have a plea to Mr Rudd: I know you don’t agree with much of what I’ve done, but not for me, 
not for some ideology, but for the children of the next generation, please give them a chance, 
give this a chance to work (The Australian, 26 November 2007).
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The second is the incoming Commonwealth Minister for Families, Housing, Community Service and Indigenous 
Affairs, Labor’s Jenny Macklin, a week later. She was reported as saying in an interview that:
she was not interested in ideology, only outcomes, and that she has ordered her department to 
collect hard data on the progress of the intervention to provide information for a 12-month 
review (Karvelas & Kearney 2007).
The same article reported Macklin as ‘refusing to attack the Howard government’s approach to indigenous affairs’ 
and as indicating that ‘radical policies’ might be applied elsewhere ‘provided they had been shown to work’.
In January 2008, after a meeting with the taskforce directing the intervention in the Northern Territory, 
Macklin was quoted as saying:
I emphasized to the taskforce that my whole approach in indigenous affairs will be based on 
evidence. I’m not interested in ideology. What I’m interested in is what works (The Age, 17 
January 2008; see also Macklin 2008a).
Six months later, when appointing a Board to conduct a one year review of the NTER, Macklin directed the 
Board to:
1.  Examine evidence and assess the overall progress of the NTER in the safety and wellbeing  
 of children and laying the basis for a sustainable and better future for residents of remote  
 communities in the Northern Territory (NT);
2.  Consider what is and isn’t working and whether the current suite of NTER measures will  
 deliver the intended results, whether any unintended consequences have emerged and  
 whether other measures should be developed; and
3.  In relation to each NTER measure, make an assessment of its effect to date, and recommend  
 any required changes to improve each measure and monitor performance (Macklin 2008b).
Clearly the idea of evidence driving policy was well to the fore in these terms of reference for the NTER 
Review Board and this was reinforced in another media statement two weeks later in which Macklin related 
the appointment of this ‘independent Review’ to the Rudd Government’s ‘commitment to an evidenced-
based approach to Indigenous policy’ (Macklin 2008c).
At the beginning of October 2008, when the NTER Review Board report was about to be submitted to the 
government, it was Prime Minister Rudd who reiterated the commitment to evidenced-based policy in 
Indigenous affairs and the condemnation of ideology:
You take it step by step, look at the evidence, what’s working what’s not and act accordingly.
We provided bipartisan support for this intervention in the first place. We said that against the 
objectives which have been set that we wanted to see the evidence in the first 12 months.
Let’s look for the evidence, see what’s working, see what’s half working, see what’s not working 
and act accordingly. That’s our approach and none of it is ideological (quoted in Karvelas 
2008).
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Two weeks on, when the Review Board’s report was finally submitted to the Commonwealth Government 
and made public, there was again much talk of evidence and its opposites. The Australian newspaper, in an 
editorial entitled ‘Response Report Card’, praised the government for its ‘sober evidence-based assessment 
rather than an emotive and politically charged appraisal’. It argued that there was evidence that ‘income 
management has put more food on the table and that an increased police presence in remote communities 
has enhanced a feeling of security’, though ‘broader aims … will take longer to quantify’ (The Australian, 
15 October 2008). By contrast however, Indigenous academic Professor Larissa Behrendt argued that the 
evidence was more that income quarantining ‘causes hardship’ and does not improve school attendance. A 
‘successful intervention’, she argued, called for ‘less emotion, more evidence’ and a move away ‘from failed 
ideological policies’ (Behrendt, 2008).
The three members of the NTER Review Board also highlighted the issue of evidence early in their report. 
Under the heading ‘Lack of evidentiary material’, they argued that ‘little or no baseline data existed against 
which to specifically evaluate the impacts of the NTER’ and that this was ‘a major problem’ for them. 
They recommended that a ‘single integrated information system’ be established by government to enable 
‘regular measurement of outcomes of all government agency programs and services that target Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory’ (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16). However, in line with their terms of 
reference, the Review Board did still proceed to make an ‘assessment’ of the seven ‘key elements’ of the NTER 
with the information that was available (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: passim). 
I will return to the report of the NTER Review Board and reactions to it in the later section of this paper 
focusing on evidence. For now, however, I wish to step back from current events and turn instead to the idea 
of competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs.
competIng prIncIples: equalIty, choIce and guardIanshIp
The simple dichotomising of ideology as bad and evidence as good in Australian Indigenous affairs is, to me, 
somewhat inadequate as an analytic schema. My suggestion for a slightly more complex schema to make 
sense of Indigenous affairs begins with the idea of three competing principles. It then moves on to how 
dominant debates, persistent ideas and ideological tendencies relate to these principles over time, before 
turning to the issue of evidence.
The dominant principle which sits at the top and centre of Australian Indigenous affairs is equality—the 
idea that in some important way Indigenous Australians ought to be equal to settler Australians. As soon as 
the equality principle is stated, however, questions arise about the way, or ways, in which it is important for 
Indigenous and other Australians to be equal, and about how any tension between different ways of being 
equal might be resolved. Writing a decade ago, Scott Bennett identified five possible ‘measures’ of equality, 
or inequality, that were worthy of attention in Australian Indigenous affairs: legal equality, political equality, 
economic equality, equality of opportunity and equal satisfaction of basic needs (Bennett 1999: 2). In my 
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analytic schema I make do with just three types of equality, which I think cover most of the same ground: 
legal equality, socioeconomic equality and equality of opportunity.2
Many debates in Australian Indigenous affairs are about whether legal equality or socioeconomic equality 
between Indigenous and settler Australians is more important and should therefore be the focus of policy 
attention. Both positions have attractions, but both also have problems. Legal equality seems simple and 
fair, but can also be seen as inadequate recognition of the distinctive historical and cultural origins of 
Indigenous people and of their contemporary disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances. The push towards 
socioeconomic equality, on the other hand, seems to address disadvantage but can also look like a somewhat 
insensitive attempt to eradicate social, historical and cultural distinctiveness along with socioeconomic 
disadvantage. Often the way to resolve these problems, philosophically, is to move to an idea of equality of 
opportunity. But this too has problems: how can we know when equality of opportunity exists? Nevertheless, 
it is this idea of equality of opportunity that I put absolutely at the top and centre of my analytic schema 
of Indigenous affairs, with the ideas of legal equality and socioeconomic equality slightly off to the left and 
right respectively (see Fig. 1).
The alternative to equality, specified affirmatively, is difference and diversity. As in other fields of social 
analysis, in Indigenous affairs difference and diversity can be seen both positively and negatively. If seen 
positively, as an indicator of informed Indigenous agency at either the group or individual level, difference 
Fig. 1. Competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs
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and diversity can become identified with a second desirable principle in Indigenous affairs—the liberal 
principle of choice and freedom. This principle can justify some degree of inequality between Indigenous 
and settler Australians, whether socioeconomic or legal, as long as the difference and diversity is seen as the 
result of responsible, informed Indigenous choice or appropriate treatment by the nation state of people 
with distinctive historical and cultural origins and contemporary circumstances. If difference and diversity 
is seen negatively, however, as an indicator of misinformed or irresponsible Indigenous agency, or of settler 
exploitation of Indigenous people, then this will invoke a third principle in Indigenous affairs policy; the 
principle of guardianship (again see Fig. 1).
The principle of guardianship enters public policy when, for one reason or another, governments believe 
that particular people within their jurisdictions are not competent judges of their own best interests; and 
that neither are their close relatives and associates who, in the absence of government intervention, would 
normally take on the role of guardian of an incompetent person’s interests. The most common invocation 
of the guardianship principle in public policy is in relation to children who have either lost their parents, 
or whose parents are deemed at a particular point in time to be unfit judges of their child’s best interests. 
But the principle is also invoked in relation to the mentally disturbed, the disabled and the infirm aged, 
among others. In relation to Indigenous people, the guardianship principle can clearly be invoked in all these 
particular individual circumstances. However it can also be invoked in relation to larger numbers or whole 
groups of Indigenous people because of a worry that the relationship between large-scale, settler industrial 
society and small-scale Indigenous societies is unequal, unjust and in some way predatory or exploitative. 
Indigenous people as whole groups can be judged as vulnerable to the encroaching power of settler industrial 
society, or parts thereof, and as not therefore competent judges of their own best interests.
These three competing principles of equality, choice and guardianship can clearly push Indigenous affairs 
policy in some quite contrasting directions. Indigenous people are at one level invited to be equal to settler 
Australians, while at the same time being given license to be different, so long as that difference is the result 
of responsible Indigenous agency and choice, at either the group or individual level. However, if difference 
is seen by governments as being the result of irresponsible Indigenous agency, or of an exploitative or 
predatory relationship with parts of settler society, then the third competing principle of guardianship will 
be invoked. This triangular relationship between competing principles is represented in Fig. 1, with equality 
at the top and centre, and choice and guardianship somewhat lower down and off to the left and right 
respectively. 
domInant deBates and persIstent Ideas In IndIgenous affaIrs hIstory
In the previous section, I have deliberately set out the three competing principles of Indigenous affairs policy 
as an analytic schema without historical referents. I have also used terms which are somewhat different from 
those employed in many conventional accounts of Australian Indigenous affairs policy history. My intention, 
in doing so, is to separate the analytic schema from the history of Australian Indigenous affairs debates over 
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time. But having established the basic analytic schema, I think it is important to relate it to policy history, 
at least of the twentieth century.
The conventional way to tell Australian Indigenous affairs policy history of the twentieth century has been 
in three parts, or periods, with the key terms attached to the consecutive thirds of the century being 
protection, assimilation and self-determination. Protection clearly relates to the principle of guardianship, 
and there is I think some truth in arguing that during the first third of the twentieth century up to the 1930s, 
the dominant debates in Australian Indigenous affairs tended towards an emphasis on the guardianship 
principle, particularly in relation to Indigenous people in more remote areas who were still coming into 
contact with settler industrial society for the first time (see for example Paisley 2005). Protection eventually, 
however, came up against the limits of its own restricted vision for Aborigines and was in time met by calls, 
even among quite conservative interests, for a more positive, optimistic policy which would see Aborigines 
moving beyond their status of protective guardianship within Australian society towards citizenship and 
equal rights. So there is also some truth in observing, as depicted in Fig. 2, that from the 1930s to the 
1960s the dominant debates of Australian Indigenous affairs gradually moved, under the influence of ideas 
Fig. 2. Dominant debates and competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs— 
a historical perspective
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like assimilation and citizenship, towards the achievement of equal legal rights for individual Aborigines 
compared with other Australians (see for example Attwood 2003: chapter 7, Chesterman & Galligan 1997: 
Chapter 6). However no sooner had such equal legal rights begun to be achieved during the 1960s than the 
limits of this approach too began to be apparent. 
In the 1970s, in a swing to the Left, the dominant debates of Australian Indigenous affairs began to move 
beyond the idea of equal individual legal rights. In part they moved towards claims for Indigenous-specific 
group rights in areas like land and organisation, in the name of Indigenous self-determination, choice, cultural 
survival and recognition as a race (see Attwood 2003: chapters 8–10; Chesterman & Galligan 1997: chapter 
7). However, reflecting the dominance of the equality principle in Indigenous affairs, dominant debates 
also moved towards the idea of achieving socioeconomic equality, rather than just legal equality, between 
Indigenous and other Australians. The debates which ensued from the 1970s to the 1990s equivocated 
profoundly between ideas of Indigenous socioeconomic difference reflecting informed cultural choice, on 
the one hand, and ongoing unjust exclusion and disadvantage of Aboriginal people within the structures 
and opportunities of settler industrial society, on the other. These debates, in short, did not know whether to 
prioritise choice or socioeconomic equality as the guiding principle of Australian Indigenous affairs.
A good example of this profound equivocation was revealed in 2002 when Tim Rowse published a book 
looking back on the work of The Australian National University’s Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research, where I and others had worked and participated in these debates over the previous decade (Altman 
ed 1991; Sanders 1991). Rowse put the issue of choice at the focal point of his work, seeing its expansion 
for Indigenous people through the ‘Indigenous sector’ and other means as ‘the defining achievement of the 
self-determination policy era’ (Rowse 2002a: 17). However, Wootten, in launching Rowse’s book, argued that 
his emphasis on increased Indigenous choice was overly optimistic and serene and overlooked the profound 
structural and psychological constraints which were still massively restricting the socioeconomic status of 
Indigenous people (Rowse 2002b; Wootten 2002). These debates over the relative importance of structure 
and agency as explanations for Indigenous people’s contemporary socioeconomic circumstances were never 
really resolved. So my representation of the dominant debates of the 1970s to 1990s in Fig. 2 does not depict 
a movement over time, as from the 1930s to the 1960s, but rather simply an ongoing debate between the 
principles of choice and socioeconomic equality.3
In the years since the turn of the millennium, the dominant debates in Australian Indigenous affairs would 
appear to have shifted quite markedly again, away from the ideas of choice and positive difference and 
diversity, and towards the ideas of guardianship, vulnerability and negative difference and diversity. This 
change has, to a significant extent, been driven by Noel Pearson who in the year 2000 published Our 
Right to Take Responsibility, a manifesto directed as much to the Indigenous people of Cape York as to 
government (Pearson 2000). Pearson argued that the equal rights of Indigenous people to award wages, 
social security payments and alcohol gained in the 1960s had—somewhat perversely and despite good 
intentions—created ‘passive welfare’ dependence in his home area of Cape York, and others like it, and 
a highly ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘corrupted’ modern Aboriginal society. He argued for a more active policy 
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paradigm in which ‘responsibility and reciprocity’ were built into ‘economic and social relationships’ and 
into government programs for Indigenous people (Pearson 2000: passim). Almost a decade on, Pearson 
has had some success in moving government policy in this direction, with the introduction of a Family 
Responsibilities Commission and aspects of income management into Cape York. The NTER has also picked 
up on these ideas, focusing on the quarantining and management of portions of Aboriginal people’s social 
security incomes as a key intervention measure.
In moving Indigenous affairs towards ‘responsibility’, Pearson has also explicitly called into question the 
principle of choice. In April 2007, in a newspaper article entitled ‘Choice is not enough’, Pearson argued that 
even when combined with the ideas of ‘opportunity’ and ‘capacity’, the idea of choice still ‘overlooks the idea 
of responsibility failure’, particularly in the ‘behaviour’ of those ‘under the influence of addictions that enthrall 
them’ (Pearson 2007d). This seems to be rediscovering the idea of vulnerable people who cannot presently 
judge their own best interests, and hence the guardianship principle in Australian Indigenous affairs.
While Pearson sees this recent shift in Indigenous affairs policy as a move to the Right after 30 years of 
domination by the Left, he also sees himself and a few others as trying to discover a radical policy centre 
rather than just being a part of this move to the Right. While I agree with Pearson’s analysis on both these 
points, I want to note a couple of things which emerge from my plotting of this latest shift in the dominant 
debates of Australian Indigenous affairs onto my analytic schema of competing principles in Fig. 2. The 
first is that this is a swing back to the Right, which generally predominated in Australian Indigenous affairs 
before the 1960s. The second is that this swing back to the Right has not occurred at the same place as the 
shift away 40 years ago. Rather than ending up back at the equal legal rights position of the 1960s at the top 
of my analytic triangle, the debate has in fact rediscovered the ideas of negative difference, vulnerability, 
protection and guardianship at the bottom of the analytic triangle. These are the ideas and principles which 
were more prevalent in Australian Indigenous affairs in the first third of the twentieth century. 
That this shift back to the Right in Australian Indigenous affairs has occurred at the bottom of the analytic 
triangle is, I think, important. It suggests that even when particular debates and principles become dominant 
in Australian Indigenous affairs, the overlooked principles never entirely disappear. The guardianship principle 
is, in many ways, a persistent idea in Australian Indigenous policy, which was moved away from for 60 or 
70 years, first in the name of equal rights and citizenship and then in the name of Indigenous rights and 
choice. The guardianship principle was almost entirely lost from view in the self-determination era, only to 
be rediscovered very quickly in the early 2000s. Something similar could also be said, in reverse, of the idea 
of self-determination, choice and positive cultural difference, which one Aboriginal historian has recently 
reminded us was still present in 1920s Aboriginal activism even though often overlooked (Maynard 2005).
So even when dominant debates appear to have almost forgotten one of these three competing principles in 
Australian Indigenous affairs, there is a sense in which they still continue to be present as a persistent idea 
which never entirely goes away. While dominant debates in Indigenous affairs do move over time in favour 
of one or two of the three competing principles over others, there is another sense in which Indigenous 
affairs is always and at all times a balancing, and re-balancing, of all three of these competing principles. 
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a fourfold categorIsatIon of IdeologIcal tendencIes
In contrasting the progressive Left and conservative Right ideological tendencies in Australian Indigenous 
affairs, Pearson generally refers to their different attitudes to rights and responsibilities. However, in a longer 
article published in 2007 in the Griffith Review, he contrasted them rather differently in terms of their 
attitude to ‘racism’ in Australian society (Pearson 2007c). The Left, he argued, tended to ‘consider racism a 
serious problem’, whereas the Right did not. Pearson characterised the Right as ‘defensive about their own 
identity and (colonial) heritage’ and as having ‘a strong tradition of denial’ of racism. The Left, by contrast, 
he saw as ‘morally vain about race and history’, with their primary concern being:
not the plight or needs of those who suffer racism and oppression, but rather their view of 
themselves, their understandings of the world and belief in their superiority over their opponents 
(Pearson 2007c: 17).
With two such unflattering portraits of the Left and Right ideological tendencies, it was, perhaps, to be 
anticipated that Pearson would argue for the clear superiority of his own preferred search for a ‘radical 
centre’ in Australian Indigenous affairs.
To understand Australian Indigenous affairs a little more deeply, I suggest we need to start with some more 
sympathetic, or at least neutral analytic views of ideological tendencies in Australian society. These need 
to focus in the first instance on attitudes towards settler society and only secondarily on attitudes towards 
Indigenous society and affairs. I also want to suggest the need for a fourfold categorisation of ideological 
tendencies, based on a distinction between their economic and social dimensions. 
In the economic dimension, the Right are the defenders of and believers in modern, large-scale industrial, 
primarily market-based society. They see the expansion of industrial society as progress towards the good 
society. To the extent that they defend an economic form which already predominates in the modern world, 
they are appropriately labelled economic conservatives. The Left, on other hand, are and have long been 
the critics and sceptics of modern, large-scale industrial, market-based society. They are not so sure that 
capitalist industrial expansion is progress towards the good society and they look for other possible images 
of what progress and the good society might be. One such image, which is now somewhat discredited, is 
modern, large-scale industrial socialism or communism. But other images of progress and the good society 
on the Left often look more to smaller scale societies which are not quite so industrial or competitive and 
market-based in their nature. Hence the Left in Australia has some fascination with Indigenous hunter-
gatherer society as a smaller scale, less industrial economic system; whereas the Right has less interest in the 
Indigenous economic system, seeing it as backwards in comparison to modern industrial production.
In the social dimension, the basic question which ideological tendencies address is whether the social 
behaviour of various groups and individuals ought to be respected as of their own responsible informed 
choosing, or whether such behaviour needs to be more externally directed in the pursuit of some good not 
yet fully appreciated and taken into account by the group in question. The basic divide which emerges is 
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between, what I call, the socially directive and the socially liberal and it is possible for both these tendencies 
to be combined with the economic tendencies towards enthusiasm for and scepticism of the goodness of 
large-scale industrial society.
This separation of social and economic dimensions produces the four ideological tendencies identified in Fig. 3 
as socially directive enthusiasts for industrial society, socially liberal enthusiasts for industrial society, socially 
directive sceptics of industrial society and social liberal sceptics of industrial society. As these are somewhat 
long labels, I reduce them by applying the words Right and Left to the economic dimension and the words 
directive and liberal to the social dimension, producing the labels directive Right, liberal Right, directive 
Left and liberal Left.4 My contention is that each of these four ideological tendencies sits in a somewhat 
different position around the triangular analytic schema of competing principles in Australian Indigenous 
affairs and that each has historically also had times of greater and lesser influence in the dominant debates 
of Australian Indigenous affairs. 
The socially directive enthusiasts for industrial society, or directive Right, sit closest to the guardianship 
principle and had their greatest influence in Australian Indigenous affairs policy in the 1930s and before. 
Fig. 3. A fourfold categorisation of ideological tendencies
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At that time the colonising, civilising mission of expanding industrial society was still being confidently 
pursued, but there was also a concern that the people of small-scale societies being encroached upon may 
be vulnerable to exploitation by elements of industrial society. So Indigenous affairs combined a protective 
attitude towards Indigenous people with a positive view of the colonising industrial society. 
The socially liberal enthusiasts for industrial society seem to sit closer to the legal equality principle in the 
analytic schema and to have had their greatest influence in Australian Indigenous affairs in the 1960s. This 
was the time when protective regimes for Aboriginal people based on the guardianship principle were brought 
to an end because of a worry that they were not positive enough about recognising the full potential and 
capacity of Indigenous people. In the name of citizenship and assimilation, the socially liberal enthusiasts for 
industrial society optimistically saw Indigenous people joining in the progress of large scale industrial society 
under a regime of equal individual legal rights.
Fig. 4. Ideological tendencies, dominant debates and competing principles in 
Australian Indigenous affairs
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The swing to the Left in Australian Indigenous affairs in the 1970s involved a considerable re-assessment of 
the ‘goodness’ of large-scale industrial society for Aboriginal people. In the words of Senator Jim Cavanagh, 
the Whitlam Labor government’s second Aboriginal Affairs minister, policy no longer assumed that Aborigines 
would become ‘indistinguishable from other Australians in their hopes, loyalties and lifestyle’, but rather was 
‘open-ended’ on such issues ‘because of its emphasis on self-determination’ (Cavanagh 1974: 12). However, 
Whitlam himself suggested that Aborigines had been ‘seriously damaged and demoralized’ by ‘200 years of 
despoliation, injustice and discrimination’, and that the new policy would require ‘active and progressive 
rehabilitation’ (Whitlam 1973: 698). These two statements again suggest the ambivalence in this swing to 
the Left in the 1970s, which still had to resolve the issue of social directiveness versus social liberalism. The 
socially directive Left, I would argue, sat closer to the idea of socioeconomic equality, seeing its achievement 
as indicating equality of opportunity for Aboriginal people in Australian society. The socially liberal Left sat 
closer to the principle of choice and seriously contemplated that some degree of socioeconomic difference 
might follow from Aboriginal self-determination.5 
Pearson has already suggested, with his twofold ideological mapping of Indigenous affairs, that there are 
elements of both the progressive Left and the conservative Right with The Australian Labor Party, and the 
same observation could also be made of the Coalition parties. My fourfold mapping of ideological tendencies 
onto the analytic triangle of three competing principles further suggests that major debates in Australian 
Indigenous affairs can occur within the Left and Right, as well as between them (see Fig. 4). Debates between 
social directiveness and social liberalism occur on both sides of the economically-defined ideological divide 
and are, in many ways, the big persistent debates in Indigenous affairs. There is also the possibility, in this 
fourfold view of ideological tendencies, of some interesting alliances across the Left/ Right ideological 
divide; which we do often observe in Australian Indigenous affairs, as Pearson (2006) notes. 
This more complex fourfold description of ideological tendencies would also seem to suggest that the entry 
of ideologies into Indigenous affairs policy debates is, in some sense, inevitable rather than avoidable. Can 
actors be neutral about their judgments of the goodness of modern large-scale industrial economic processes 
in comparison to remnant hunter-gatherer production, and about social directiveness and liberalism? And 
if they could, would they be useful participants in policy debates? Ideological tendencies, in this more 
analytic sense of large underlying ideas about the nature of society and economy, would seem almost a 
prerequisite for contributing to Indigenous affairs policy debates, rather than something to be avoided as 
a bad influence. Ideology, thus understood, is fundamental to making a contribution to policy, rather than 
something which is bad and either can or should be avoided.
What role evIdence?
What then is the role of evidence in Australian Indigenous affairs? I want to approach this final question by 
returning to the Report of the NTER Review Board, published in October 2008, and reactions to it. You will 
recall that the terms of reference asked the Review Board to ‘examine evidence and assess the overall progress 
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of the NTER’ and ‘in relation to each NTER measure, make an assessment of its effects to date’ (Macklin 
2008b; also Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 66). You will also recall that early in their report the Review Board 
noted the lack of ‘baseline data to specifically evaluate the impacts of the NTER’ and that this was ‘a major 
problem’ for them (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16). So how did a Review Board proceed which was charged 
with looking at the evidence, but which judged early on that there was a ‘lack of evidentiary material’? (Yu, 
Duncan & Gray 2008: 16). And what does this tell us about the nature of evidence in Australian Indigenous 
affairs, and possibly also in policy processes more generally?
The Review Board report began by stating that it:
placed primary importance on establishing face-to-face dialogue with Aboriginal people and 
encouraging them to put forward their views on the NTER and its impact on their lives – both 
good and bad (Yu, Duncan and Gray 2008: 16).
The Board told of their meetings with representatives of 56 communities and 140 organisations. They 
recounted seeking ‘public submissions’ (they received over 200) and meeting with ‘relevant Commonwealth 
and Northern Territory agencies’ who provided ‘background briefing material’, plus some ‘data and specific 
information requested by the Board’ (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16). The Review Board also noted that they 
convened three meetings of an Expert Group, the 11 members of which ‘generously provided their expertise 
and advice in response to the Board’s requests’ (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16). On the basis of these four 
sources of information the Review Board proceeded to make an assessment of each of the seven intervention 
measures in terms of:
their impact on the local communities, the strengths and weaknesses of the initiatives and 
whether government should consider alternatives in pursuit of its objectives to improve the 
protection of children and advance the wellbeing of Aboriginal families and communities in the 
Northern Territory (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 20).
Chapter 2 of the Review Board’s report examined, in turn, each of the seven ‘measures’ within the NTER, and 
their various ‘sub-measures’. This chapter of the report is predominantly negative in tone, citing numerous 
instances in which submissions and community meetings had adverse and critical things to say about the 
measures and a minority of instances in which more positive comments were made. Chapter 2 is also notable 
for its primarily anecdotal tone, citing lots of what people said in submissions and meetings, while being 
very cautious about the few available sources of statistics, as I will discuss further shortly. My third general 
observation is that, in the terms of a useful schema recently elaborated by Head, virtually all the information 
used by the Review Board to assess the NTER was ‘practical implementation knowledge’, rather than ‘scientific 
(research-based) knowledge’ (Head 2008): i.e. knowledge generated in the processes of service delivery by 
providers and consumers, rather than knowledge generated by research processes.6 This may reflect the 
short-time scales of both the NTER and the Review Board’s work, but I would suggest that it is in fact the 
normal situation in Indigenous affairs policy processes. Head’s third form of knowledge in evidenced-based 
policy processes, ‘political knowledge’, would also seem indispensable. Without working through all that was 
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said on all measures and sub-measures in Chapter 2 of the NTER Review Board report, I will try to give some 
sense of its style in relation to two or three sub-measures.
On ‘income management’, the ‘most widely recognized measure’ of the NTER, the Review Board reported 
‘competing views’ about its ‘direct and profound impact on the lives of over 13,300 individuals’ subject 
to it by 30 June 2008. They reported ‘widespread disillusionment, resentment and anger in a significant 
segment of the Indigenous community’ about the ‘blanket imposition of compulsory income management’ 
in prescribed areas and the lack of any ‘opportunity’ for people who ‘responsibly manage their income’ to 
‘negotiate’ the arrangement. The Board also reported ‘confusion and anxiety’ arising from the requirement 
‘to master new, complex and often changing procedures with a minimum of information and explanation’, 
leading to complaints to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and ‘difficulties associated with acquiring and 
using store cards’ as part of income management (Yu, Duncan and Gray 2008: 20). On the more positive 
side, the Review Board noted that ‘many Aboriginal people, especially women, along with the observations 
of local clinicians, school teachers and storekeepers’ supported income management and felt that it had 
‘benefited’ people by enabling them to ‘avoid or limit “humbugging”’ and to ‘manage their income and 
family budgets’ in ways ‘which they had not done previously’ (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 21). Reflecting this 
more positive experience, the Review Board recommended (2008: 23):
income management be available on a voluntary basis to community members who choose to 
have some of their income quarantined for specific purposes, as determined by them.
However, reflecting the more negative comments it also recommended that the ‘current blanket application 
of compulsory income management’ in prescribed areas should ‘cease’ and be replaced by a compulsory 
scheme which ‘should only apply on the basis of child protection, school enrolment and attendance and 
other relevant behavioural triggers’, but which would apply ‘across the Northern Territory’ rather than just 
in prescribed areas (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 23).
On the ‘alcohol and drugs’ sub-measures within the ‘law and order’ measure, the Review Board noted 
(2008: 24):
Numerous submissions report that large numbers of people have continued to drink outside the 
prescribed areas. 
There was also, they argued (2008: 24):
anecdotal evidence that the Commonwealth declaration of prescribed communities has resulted 
in drinking camps shifting further away from community boundaries (as the prescribed areas are 
larger than the communities themselves).
Some communities, they continued, welcomed ‘the resulting reduction in noise and anti-social behaviour’. 
But other communities had (2008: 24):
expressed increased safety concerns for children when parents are moving further away to drink 
and leaving their children for longer periods.
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Towards the end of their discussion of the alcohol sub-measures, the Board noted (2008: 25) that they 
were:
not convinced there is any evidence to indicate that the NTER requirement for a person to show 
identification when buying $100 or more of takeaway alcohol is effective or capable of being 
monitored in a way that enables action to be taken .
They thought it ‘unclear’ how this sub-measure was ‘intended to achieve a result’ and suggested that a ‘more 
workable alternative to achieve the results originally intended’ might be given consideration (Yu, Duncan & 
Gray 2008: 25).
On the policing sub-measures, the Board reported that ‘18 additional temporary police stations’ had been 
built and ‘an additional 51 police’ deployed. The general tone of the report on this sub-measure was also 
more positive (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 25):
Numerous submissions from Aboriginal community organisations and service providers in remote 
communities indicate that the additional police are needed and welcomed. The Northern Territory 
Government said in its submission that ‘there is clear evidence that communities are safer’.
The only negative sentiment reported seemed to be the ‘view expressed’ in submissions that ‘policing 
arrangements needed to be normalized’ to involve Northern Territory police officers and also made 
‘permanent’ (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 25). Of greater interest to my current purpose was the limited use 
made of police statistics which showed:
increases in reported and detected crimes in prescribed communities from 2006–07 to 2007–8 
(Yu Duncan & Gray 2008: 116).
The Review Board treated these statistics with great caution and confined them to an appendix. In the body 
of their report they simply stated that ‘expert advice to the Board’ suggested that it was ‘too early to draw 
any significant conclusions from this data’ and that all it really showed was (2008: 26): 
that a police station is now operating and that crime in being reported – it does not provide a 
measure of the actual level of crime before and after the establishment of the station.
This example of the police statistics is, I think, worth dwelling on, as it is often just this sort of hard, 
quantitative data that advocates of evidenced-based policy seek. However, when they obtain such data 
they often realise that, of itself, it doesn’t actually tell them very much. The data, or evidence, needs to be 
interpreted in relation to a context and an argument, rather than simply standing alone as an indicator of 
what works or doesn’t work. In this instance, where police numbers had just gone up, an increase in the level 
of reported and detected crime was seen as good evidence of at least getting police systems up and running 
in communities. However in a few years time when police numbers are more stable, the evidence being 
looked for as an indicator of success will more likely be a decrease in crimes detected and reported.
A similar argument could be made in the child protection area, where the Review Board had access to 
statistics which showed a 93 per cent increase in numbers of ‘notifications’ in the Northern Territory 
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since 2001 and a 120 per cent increase in the number of children in care. Again the Board treated these 
statistics with great caution. They expressed their agreement with a 2003 inquiry which had suggested 
‘grossly disproportionate … under-reporting’ of Aboriginal child protection matters in the Northern Territory 
compared to other jurisdictions and that this was ‘symptomatic of the failure of the child protection system 
in the Northern Territory’ (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 34). The Review Board acknowledged that there had 
been recent ‘reforms’ in the Northern Territory child protection system but (2008: 34):
found no evidence of increased confidence in reporting child maltreatment in Aboriginal 
communities. 
They then recounted hearing of:
recent examples of attempts to report abuse or neglect to child protection authorities where 
there was no effective response (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 34).
So the statistics were again interpreted in a way which suggested a context of just establishing a service 
delivery system and as a result expecting increases in numbers of reports and cases, even though reforms in 
child protection had supposedly been occurring for several years.
These examples of the rather tentative use of statistics in the NTER Review Board Report suggests that 
evidence in policy processes is, as Majone argued twenty years ago, just a small part of a much larger process 
of argument and persuasion. Evidence, Majone (1989: 48) argued, is: 
information selected from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in an argument 
‘to persuade the mind that a given factual proposition is true or false’ .
The effectiveness of evidence can, he noted, be destroyed by:
an inappropriate choice of data, their placement at a wrong point in the argument, (or) a style 
of presentation that is unsuitable for the audience to which the argument is directed (Majone 
1989: 48).
So, with any contribution to a policy process, it may be as important to focus on the arguments being made, 
and to whom, as on the specific piece of data or evidence being used. What were the arguments of NTER 
Review Board, and who were they trying to persuade of what?
Despite all the negative and critical commentary drawn from their various information sources, the Report 
of the NTER Review Board argued strongly in favour of the continuation of the intervention, though with 
some changes towards a more participatory and consultative approach.7 The three paragraphs which best 
captured this tone of argument, and its qualification, occurred towards the end of the report’s ‘executive 
summary’:
The situation in remote communities and town camps was—and remains—sufficiently acute to 
be described as a national emergency. The NTER should continue.
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There is a need for a bipartisan commitment to a sustained national effort, and a sustained 
commitment of the funds necessary, to provide Aboriginal children and families in these 
communities with a level of safety and wellbeing comparable to any other Australian 
community.
The single most valuable resource that the NTER has lacked from its inception is the positive, 
willing participation of the people it was intended to help. The most essential element in moving 
forward is for government to re-engage with the Aboriginal people of the Northern Territory 
(Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 10–11).
These three paragraphs captured quite succinctly the way in which argument in Australian Indigenous affairs 
is always balancing the three competing principles of my analytic schema. In the middle paragraph we 
see the dominant equality principle, in the form of a claim that ‘Aboriginal children and families in these 
communities’ ought to have ‘a level of safety and wellbeing comparable to other Australian communities’. 
In the third paragraph we see the reference to Aboriginal agency and choice, in the form of ‘the positive, 
willing participation of the people it was intended to help’; which the Review Board sees the NTER as having 
‘lacked from its inception’ but requiring if it is to move ‘forward’. In the first paragraph, we find an agreement 
with the fundamental contention that the situation in these Aboriginal communities is sufficiently bad to 
justify the language of national emergency, and this will inevitably lead to at least some external definition 
of people’s interests and an invoking of the guardianship principle.
While paying due respect to all three competing principles in their argumentative process, the Review Board 
was, it seems to me, also trying to resist somewhat the recent headlong rush towards re-emphasising the 
guardianship principle and possibly, in the process, losing site of the importance of engaging with Indigenous 
people’s agency and choice. This can be seen not only in their general argument in favour of an approach 
which engages much more with the ‘positive, willing participation’ of the Aboriginal constituency but also 
in their specific call for a shift away from blanket, compulsory income management in prescribed areas, as 
discussed above. It can also be seen in the second of their ‘overarching recommendations’. The first of these 
recommendations was for both the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory Governments to continue:
to address the unacceptably high level of disadvantage and social dislocation being experienced 
by Aboriginal Australians living in remote communities throughout the Northern Territory ( Yu, 
Duncan & Gray 2008: 12).
The second was to base the ‘relationship with Aboriginal people’ on ‘genuine consultation, engagement and 
partnership’. The third was to make ‘government actions’ conform with the Racial Discrimination Act (Yu, 
Duncan & Gray 2008: 12). But were the Board’s arguments and recommendations persuasive to the minister 
and government to whom they were directed?
On 23 October 2008, in announcing the Rudd Government’s initial response to the NTER Review Board’s 
report, Minister Macklin indicated an acceptance of the three ‘overarching recommendations’ but also 
identified, as the headline item, that compulsory income management was to ‘continue’ because of its 
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‘demonstrated benefit for women and children’. Because of this the ‘current stabilisation phase of the NTER’ 
would continue ‘for the next twelve months’ before transition to a ‘long-term’ phase which would not rely 
on the ‘suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act’ (Macklin 2008d). However, even in this longer term 
phase, it appeared, compulsory income management would probably continue:
The government is strongly committed to compulsory income management as a tool to reduce 
alcohol-related violence, protect children, guard against humbugging and promote personal 
responsibility.
The existing comprehensive compulsory income management measures are yielding vital benefits 
to Indigenous communities and many Indigenous people want them to continue (Macklin 
2008d).
While the term ‘evidence’ was not used in this written government statement, it came to the fore when 
Macklin elaborated verbally. In a television interview later in the day, the opening question focused on the 
evidence to support compulsory income management and Macklin answered as follows:
The best evidence I have available to me is twofold: one coming from some excellent evidence 
that’s been collected from the stores showing that there’s been a significant increase in the 
purchase of fresh fruit and vegetables, increased purchases of fresh meat, we are also seeing 
some of the children putting on weight, income management has also allowed people to save 
for whitegoods, there’s been a reduction in the consumption of cigarettes and alcohol, so there’s 
some direct evidence.
Some of the more anecdotal evidence is really coming from particularly all of the women that 
I have spoken to in many, many communities, some of whom I’d have to say have pleaded with 
me to keep compulsory income management (7.30 Report, 23 October 2008).
Macklin’s argument put a more positive interpretation on the practice-based evidence surrounding 
compulsory income management than the NTER Review Board. In terms of my analytic schema, Macklin 
seemed to be defending the guardianship aspects of compulsory income management not only with 
evidence derived from practitioner third parties, like the store keepers, but also from people subject to the 
measure themselves. This latter is, of course, highly prized evidence for those who invoke the guardianship 
principle in policy processes. When parties subject to an external definition of their interests quickly adopt 
that definition as their own, then the invoking of the guardianship principle seems well justified, as well 
as consistent with a more informed exercise of choice. As Macklin put it in response to the next interview 
question, the government wanted ‘to see the development of strong social norms in these communities’ 
and, as far as she was concerned, there was ‘very strong evidence that it’s coming from compulsory income 
management’ (7.30 Report, 23 October 2008).
So evidence could be found and woven into both sides of this argument about compulsory income 
management, which was in my analytic schema a struggle between the choice and guardianship principles. 
Evidence did not stand alone as demonstrating what worked. It had to be contextualised, interpreted and 
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inserted at appropriate points in arguments between the competing principles of guardianship and choice 
and the ideological tendencies towards social liberalism and directiveness.
the radIcal centre and evIdence: some concludIng remarKs
In conclusion I want to return to Pearson’s idea of the radical centre in Australian Indigenous affairs and to 
how it relates to the idea of evidence. 
Pearson’s account of the radical centre does not focus on evidence at all. Rather he talks about this centre 
being a point of high ‘dialectical tension’ between ‘opposing principles’ where ‘policy positions’ are ‘much 
closer and more carefully calibrated than most people imagine’ (Pearson 2007c: 25). Pearson identifies 
ten dichotomous sets of ‘classic dialectical tensions in human policy’, but confines his discussion in the 
context of Indigenous affairs to just five: social order versus liberty or freedom, idealism versus realism or 
pragmatism, structure versus behaviour, opportunity versus choice and, finally, rights versus responsibility. 
Pearson (2007c: 29) argues that the:
resolution of each of these tensions lies in their dialectical synthesis, and not through the 
absolute triumph of one side of a struggle or a weak compromise.
He also argues (2007c: 29) that ‘complexity arises because questions of human policy ... involve a number of 
tensions simultaneously’, rather than being neatly confined to the ‘isolated categories of a ten-point list’.
While this is a somewhat different construction of competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs 
to my own, it does seem that Pearson and I agree in general on the importance of opposing or competing 
principles, and the way in which they are forever being balanced and synthesised rather than definitively 
resolved in Australian Indigenous affairs. Evidence in Indigenous affairs plays just a small role in a much 
larger argumentative struggle, not only between competing principles but also between different, largely 
unavoidable, ideological tendencies. Australian Indigenous affairs needs to transcend the simple dichotomy 
of evidence being good and ideology being bad. The idea of competing principles, however schematised, is 
a far more powerful analytic device. 
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notes
1. For a collection of essays reacting almost immediately to the announcement of the NTER, see Altman & 
Hinkson 2007.
2. Political equality may be another dimension not well captured in this analytic schema; see footnote 3 below. 
3. The term self-determination also invokes ideas of equality between political communities. One comment I received 
in response to a draft of this paper was that the competing principles are all versions of equality; it is just a matter 
of which kind of equality is seen as important.
4. This rather analytic labelling does not give much sense of history or, in the case of the socially directive ideological 
tendencies, from where they draw their inspiration for the objective, external definition of people’s interests. The 
directive Left has tended historically to draw on Marx or other socialist thinkers, and could at times, but far from 
always, be referred to as the socialist Left. The directive Right has tended historically to draw on religion and the 
idea of a God as the objective definer of interests, and could at times be referred to as the religious Right, or 
possibly also Christian conservatism. However the relationship between religious commitment and Indigenous 
affairs in Australia is complex, with religious people appearing among those with ideological tendencies to the 
Left as well as to the Right. So I have in this paper and in my labelling of the four ideological tendencies largely 
avoided this issue of religion. Generally, however, I think it is true to say that religious influences were greatly 
lessened in Indigenous affairs in the swing to the Left in the 1970s and are now, somewhat tentatively, re-
establishing some presence.
5. One commentator on a draft of this paper suggested that the socially directive Left could also be seen as those 
who value the maintenance of distinct Aboriginal cultures irrespective of the choices of Aboriginal people. This 
position, which does have some currency in Indigenous affairs, is perhaps not well captured in my analytic schema 
of competing principles and Left/ Right ideological tendencies. Another commentator suggested that I should 
remove all reference to Left and Right and just focus on the competing principles. I am attracted to this idea for a 
future paper, but found it overwhelming in revision of the current paper which already had the ideas of Left and 
Right ideological tendencies deeply embedded within it. 
6. The closest thing there was to scientific research knowledge referred to in the report was some demographic 
work on the current and projected populations of the prescribed areas based on the 2006 Census by my colleague 
at CAEPR, John Taylor, who was one of the 11 expert advisors to the Review Board. This work was published in 
an appendix to the Review Board report and only referred to briefly in the report as part of the ‘demographic 
context’. This work also attempted to look at mobility issues using Centrelink data about change of address. Head’s 
threefold schema of knowledge related to evidenced–based policy may be a reworking of ideas dating back as far 
as Aristotle (Tenbensel 2006).
7. Lea (2008) has noted how, as part of a process of reproducing helping organisations, a very negative understanding 
of current situations in Indigenous affairs is combined with an ever hopeful analysis of the potential for 
improvement.
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